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Comparing Capital Income and Wealth
Taxes
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Abstract
As part of the Pepperdine Law Review Symposium The Impact of the
2017 Tax Act on Income and Wealth Inequality: Lessons for 2020 and
Beyond, this Essay compares two reform directions to rebuild the progressive
tax system: an improved capital income tax—which would eliminate the
benefit from deferring gains until a sale—or a wealth tax.
The Essay first introduces the concept of a “rate-equivalent” wealth or
capital income tax as a way to assess reform alternatives consistently and to
identify the assumptions as to how the reforms would be structured. For any
chosen capital income tax (or wealth tax) reform, the rate-equivalent wealth
tax (or capital income tax) is the tax yielding the same tax liability for a
taxpayer earning a specified investment return rate. The Essay then
illustrates how this concept can help illuminate the assumptions behind
comparisons of wealth tax and capital income tax reforms in the literature.
Some views in the literature suggest that policymakers should favor an
improved capital income tax because the two reforms can have comparable
economic effects, while a capital income tax is more desirable in other
respects.
The Essay surveys the literature evaluating three aspects of these
reforms—their economic effects, administrability and avoidance
opportunities, and constitutionality—and offers additional perspective on
how in each area the distinctions between the two reforms are often narrower
than they are sometimes assumed to be in the literature. In many cases the
analysis of these reforms will also depend on the particular manner in which
 Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I thank Jake
Brooks, David Gamage, and Clint Wallace for helpful comments and suggestions and Kamal Qteishat
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each reform is structured or the baseline against which the reform is
measured. For this reason, policymakers should not reach categorical
conclusions that one reform direction is intrinsically more desirable than the
other.
The Essay concludes by considering one respect in which an improved
capital income tax or a wealth tax can unambiguously differ: as different
measures for comparing taxpayers in a progressive tax system. This
distinction, however, will depend on the normative choice as to how inequality
should be measured and mitigated by the tax system. For example, the choice
between a capital income tax and a wealth tax could have different
consequences, depending upon whether one assumes that the progressive tax
system should mitigate differences in utility, income, wealth, or a combination
thereof.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As part of this Symposium on The Impact of the 2017 Tax Act on Income
and Wealth Inequality: Lessons for 2020 and Beyond, this Essay compares
two reform directions to rebuild the progressive tax system: an improved
capital income tax that eliminates the benefit from deferring gains until a
realization event, or a wealth tax.
The 2017 tax legislation1 introduced structural changes that primarily
benefitted the wealthiest taxpayers and reduced the progressivity of the tax
system.2 The legislation also exploited and compounded design problems in
the current income tax system which inhibit the fair and efficient taxation of
investment income,3 so that its regressive changes could entrench a less
progressive tax system over time.4 An improved capital income tax and a
wealth tax represent the two most promising reform directions to reverse these
trends and to restore fairness to the tax system.5
1. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
2. Among its most prominent changes, the legislation nearly halved the corporate tax rate and
introduced a new deduction for income earned through “pass-through businesses.” Id. at § 13001
(codified at I.R.C. § 11 (2017)) (reduction in the corporate tax rate); § 11001 (codified at I.R.C. § 199A
(2017)) (new pass-through business deduction). For discussion of these changes and their effects, see
David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017
Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1445, 1459–61 (2019). The legislation delivered its greatest
benefits to higher income taxpayers, in both absolute and relative terms. Id. at 1445–58. One
contemporary study estimated that taxpayers in the bottom income quintile would receive a tax cut
equivalent to only 0.4% of their after-tax income, or approximately $60. TAX POLICY CENTER STAFF,
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS
ACT 3–4 (2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/150816/2001641_
distributional_analysis_of_the_conference_agreement_for_the_tax_cuts_and_jobs_act_0.pdf. This
study estimated that taxpayers in the top income percentile would receive a tax cut equivalent to 3.4%
of their after-tax income, or approximately $51,000. Id. at 3. U.S. Treasury researchers estimated that
72% of the total savings from the new Section 199A pass-through deduction accrue to the top 5% of
taxpayers. LUCAS GOODMAN, KATHERINE LIM, BRUCE SACERDOTE & ANDREW WHITTEN, U.S.
TREASURY OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, SIMULATING THE 199A DEDUCTION FOR PASS-THROUGH
OWNERS 13 (2019). The changes in the 2017 legislation compounded the trend of declining overall
progressivity in the tax system. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROJECTED CHANGES IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 2016 TO 2021, at 12–16, 17–19 (2019) (finding that growth
in household income, after taxes and transfers, has increased much more quickly at the top of the
income distribution in recent years, in part because of the declining progressivity of the tax system).
3. See infra Section II.A. (describing how the current rules for taxing capital income inhibit
progressive taxation).
4. See Ari Glogower & David Kamin, The Progressivity Ratchet, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1499, 1550–
75 (2019) (describing how, absent structural reforms, lower taxes on corporations and pass-through
businesses can inhibit progressive taxation throughout the tax system).
5. See generally David Kamin, How Far to Go in Reforming Taxation of Wealth: Revenue and
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Although an improved capital income tax and a wealth tax could have
similar economic effects,6 the two reforms would be structured differently and
would tax different bases.7 The Essay first introduces the concept of a “rateequivalent” wealth or capital income tax as a way to assess reform alternatives
consistently and to identify the assumptions underlying any comparison as to
how the reforms would be structured.8 For any chosen capital income tax (or
wealth tax) reform, the rate-equivalent wealth tax (or capital income tax) is
the reform alternative yielding the same tax liability for a taxpayer earning a
specified investment return rate.9 The Essay then illustrates how this concept
can help illuminate the assumptions behind comparisons of wealth tax and
capital income tax reforms in the literature.10
The Essay then considers comparisons of the two reforms.11 One general
line of reasoning in the literature as to which reform is more desirable may be
characterized as follows: The economic objectives of a net wealth tax can be
achieved through an improved capital income tax. At the same time, a wealth
tax would face other possible problems, such as potential challenges of
administrability and constitutionality.12 Even more abstractly, this argument
may be characterized as follows: A wealth tax and a capital income tax are
similar in critical respects, but a wealth tax is detrimental in other respects;
therefore, policymakers should favor the latter.
This Essay argues, however, that this argument can just as easily run in
the opposite direction: The areas of overlap and difference between an
improved capital income tax and a wealth tax can also indicate the relative

Tax Avoidance, 168 TAX NOTES FED. 1225, 1225–34 (2020) (describing a wealth tax and a capital
income tax reform as two fundamental reform options to raise revenue and address economic
inequality, which are likely to be more effective than more modest incremental reforms).
6. See infra Section III.A.
7. See infra Sections II.B., II.C.
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. See infra Section III.A.
10. See infra notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
11. Of course, policymakers need not consider these two reforms as mutually exclusive and may
instead consider methods to coordinate the taxation of both capital income and wealth. See generally
Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1421 (2018) (describing the role of both income
and wealth in a progressive tax system and how the two measures may be integrated in a single tax
instrument).
12. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, Wealth Tax Is a Decent Idea, Though Probably Unconstitutional,
WALL STREET J. (Dec. 5, 2019, 7:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wealth-tax-is-a-decent-ideathough-probably-unconstitutional-11575591063 (arguing that capital income tax reforms can achieve
similar economic effects as would a wealth tax with less constitutional risk).
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desirability of a wealth tax, rather than just the advantages of a capital income
tax.13 Furthermore, the same design challenges in implementing a wealth tax
can also pose challenges to capital income tax reforms, depending on how the
capital income tax reform is structured.14
The Essay surveys the literature evaluating three aspects of these
reforms—their economic effects, administrability and avoidance
opportunities, and constitutionality—and offers additional perspective on
how, in each area, the distinctions between the two reforms are often narrower
than they are sometimes assumed to be in the literature.15 In many cases, the
analysis of these reforms will also depend on the particular manner in which
each reform is structured or the baseline against which the reform is measured.
Because of these similarities, policymakers should not reach categorical
conclusions that one reform direction is intrinsically more desirable than the
other. While policymakers should take seriously the challenges in
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Section III.B.
15. See infra Part III. This brief Essay highlights certain salient considerations in the choice
between a wealth tax and capital income tax reforms but does not offer a comprehensive analysis of
every policy aspect of these instruments or the choice between them. For recent works on the
distinctions between capital income and wealth taxes, see generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV., Tax Policy Studies No. 26, THE ROLE AND DESIGN OF NET WEALTH TAXES IN THE OECD
(2018) [hereinafter OECD] (assessing net wealth taxes, personal capital income taxes, and wealth
transfer taxes); Lily Batchelder & David Kamin, Policy Options for Taxing the Rich, in MAINTAINING
THE STRENGTH OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 200–234 (Melissa S. Kearney & Amy Ganz eds., 2019),
https://www.economicstrategygroup.org/publication/maintaining-the-strength-of-americancapitalism/ (discussing four tax proposals that would tax the wealthy in order to increase revenue);
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Not So Fast: The Hidden Difficulties of Taxing Wealth, 58 NOMOS WEALTH
VOLUME 261, 284–85 (2017) (describing design challenges with a wealth tax); David Gamage & John
R. Brooks, Tax Now or Tax Never: Political Optionality and the Case for Current-Assessment Tax
Reform, 100 N.C. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021); Ari Glogower, Taxing Capital Appreciation, 70
TAX L. REV. 11, 128–42 (2016) (describing reform options for a capital income tax); Daniel Hemel,
Taxing Wealth in an Uncertain World, 70 NAT’L TAX L. REV. 128–42 (2016) (describing different
potential obstacles to either a wealth tax or capital income tax reform); Kamin, supra note 5
(comparing the revenue raising potential of a wealth tax and capital income tax reform with more
modest incremental reforms); Greg Leiserson, Taxing Wealth, in TACKLING THE TAX CODE:
EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE WAYS TO RAISE REVENUE 89–147 (Jay Shambaugh & Ryan Nunn eds.,
2020) (detailing four proposals that would strengthen the tax base of and increase the tax rate on the
wealthy); Beverly Moran, Wealth Redistribution and the Income Tax, 53 HOWARD L.J. 319, 321–35
(2010) (describing the benefits of a wealth tax over an income tax as a method for redistribution);
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, at 437, 438, 469–85 (2019) (describing the progressive effects of a wealth tax); Deborah
H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423 (2000) (proposing a tax on
wealth through a capital income tax reform); David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive
Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499, 500–31 (2000) (proposing and evaluating a wealth tax).
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implementing either reform, it would also be a mistake to overstate these
challenges or to presume they are categorically unique to one reform or the
other.
The Essay concludes by considering one respect in which an improved
capital income tax or a wealth tax can unambiguously differ: as different
measures for comparing taxpayers in a progressive tax system.16 From this
perspective, a wealth tax may yield unique advantages over a capital income
tax, as a different measure of a taxpayer’s economic circumstances. This
distinction, however, will depend in turn on normative choice as to the
measure of inequality that the progressive tax base should ameliorate. For
example, the choice between a capital income tax and a wealth tax will have
different consequences, depending upon whether one assumes that the
progressive tax system should ameliorate differences in utility, income,
wealth, or a combination thereof.17
The remainder of the Essay proceeds as follows. Part II briefly reviews
the current rules for taxing capital income, the problems with these rules, and
the alternative possible directions of an improved capital income tax or a
wealth tax. Part III introduces the concept of rate-equivalent capital income
or wealth taxes, describes different aspects of the similarities and differences
between the two possible reform directions, and explains why both face
similar challenges and considerations. This Part also explains how the
analysis may depend more on the particular structure of these reforms than on
their formal labels. Part IV then considers the differences between a capital
income tax and a wealth tax as different measures for comparing taxpayers in
a progressive tax system.
II. THE DESIGN OF CAPITAL INCOME AND WEALTH TAXES
A. Current Law
The federal income tax base notionally includes “all income from
whatever source derived,”18 including capital income earned in the form of

16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Section IV.B.
18. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2017). The Code also explicitly excludes certain items from income, in I.R.C.
§§ 101–140.
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business income,19 capital gains,20 interest,21 dividends,22 or otherwise.23 In
practice, however, the realization rule—which defers tax on capital gains until
the time of a sale or exchange24—allows taxpayers to avoid or reduce the tax
owed on certain forms of capital income by holding assets for longer and
delaying a realization event.25 The tax avoidance opportunities allowed by
the realization rule, in turn, reduce the amount of revenue raised at the current
preferential rates on capital income26 and limit the revenue-raising potential
from further rate increases.27 For these reasons, Professor Bill Andrews
famously referred to the realization rule as the “Achilles’ Heel” of the income
tax.28
19. I.R.C. § 61(a)(2).
20. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3).
21. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).
22. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
23. See I.R.C. § 61(a). For example, some capital income may be taxed as mischaracterized labor
income. See Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic
Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 181 (2011) (describing the practical
challenges in distinguishing between capital and labor income, and why this challenge offers an
additional argument for positive taxation of capital).
24. I.R.C. § 1001.
25. Glogower, supra note 15, at 114–26 (describing the realization rule and its consequences for
the tax system); see generally Edward J. McCaffery, Proceedings: Annual Conference on Taxation
and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association, 93 NAT’L TAX ASS’N 268, 271
(2000) (describing how taxpayers can use the realization rule to avoid paying taxes on capital income).
26. Long-term capital gains and qualified dividends are currently taxed at top marginal rates of
23.8%. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1411.
27. See Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48
TAX L. REV. 319, 350–53 (1993); Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57
TAX L. REV. 355, 392 (2004) (explaining how the realization rule limits the revenue raising potential
from higher capital gains rates). All conventional estimates find, however, that the revenuemaximizing rate on capital gains is significantly higher than the top rates under current law. See
Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 15, at 211–12 (reviewing estimates of the revenue maximizing rates
under current law and in connection with incremental reforms).
28. William D. Andrews, The Achilles’ Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980S, at 278 (Charls E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield
eds., 1983). Andrews describes the problems of the current realization-based income tax system, and
how they could imply alternative reform directions, including reforms to address the current problems
with income taxation or a switch to alternative tax bases. Id. Andrews advocated for a shift to a
consumption tax combined with a “strengthened estate and gift tax” but acknowledged the alternative
possibility of income tax reforms. William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1148 (1974) (“[S]ome of our existing problems could probably
be ameliorated by fuller reflection of real accretion, but no practical solution in this direction offers
anything approaching the simple practicality of a consumption-type or cash flow personal income
tax.”); id. at 1172–73 (describing the advantages of pairing a consumption tax with a more robust
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Because of the realization rule, Congress cannot fairly and efficiently tax
capital income by simply increasing the marginal rates under current law.
Scholars and policymakers have consequently recognized that more
effectively taxing capital income will also require reforms to the definition of
the taxable base, rather than changes in the rates alone.29
B. An Improved Capital Income Tax
Scholars and policymakers have proposed a variety of options to reform
the definition of the capital income tax base in order to overcome the obstacles
posed by the realization rule and thereby more fairly and efficiently tax capital
income.30 These various “accrual taxation” methods would instead account
for annual changes in asset values, so that taxpayers would not be able to
reduce their tax liabilities by holding assets for longer and avoiding a
realization event.31
Some methods would tax annual changes in asset values prospectively,
based on the expectation appreciation or “growth path” of each asset.
Prospective taxation could be based on general expectation of the growth
paths for all assets or for specific categories of assets, or on the specific
expectations of the growth path for each individual asset. For example, one
generalized prospective method would impute an assumed return each year to
the taxpayer’s original cost basis in the asset, as adjusted for the presumed
return in prior years.32 Alternatively, this same method can be modified to
estate and gift tax).
29. For proposals combining both reforms to the taxation of individual capital income with
adjustments to the rates on both corporate and individual income, see Harry Grubert & Rosanne
Altshuler, Shifting the Burden of Taxation from the Corporate to the Personal Level and Getting the
Corporate Tax Rate Down to 15 Percent, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 643, 658–62 (2016); ERIC TODER & ALAN
D. VIARD, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., A PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE TAXATION OF
CORPORATE INCOME (2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publicationpdfs/2000817-a-proposal-to-reform-the-taxation-of-corporate-income.pdf.
30. Others have proposed more modest incremental reforms to reduce, but not eliminate, the
benefits for capital income. See, e.g., NATASHA SARIN, LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS & JOE KUPFERBERG,
TAX REFORM FOR PROGRESSIVITY: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (The Hamilton Project ed., 2020)
(proposing incremental changes to the tax system including taxing capital gains at higher rates and
eliminating the basis step up at death under section 1014 while objecting to more “radical proposals,
like wealth taxation and mark-to-market reforms”).
31. The categorization of different methods of accrual taxation in this section is based on the
categorizations in Glogower, supra note 15, at 113, and in Alvin C. Warren, Jr., U.S. Income Taxation
of New Financial Products, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 899, 914–20 (2004).
32. See Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A
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utilize general rates of appreciation each year for assets in certain classes.33
For some investments, a prospective method could tax the specific expected
value of each asset over the investment period.34 In all of these cases, the total
gain or loss can be corrected upon a subsequent realization event, so that the
taxpayer is only taxed over time on the total gain or loss experienced.35
Other methods would tax annual changes in asset values each year, based
on the observed changes in values in that year, regardless of the presence or
absence of a realization event. For example, a “mark-to-market” system
would tax asset gain or loss each period, based on the asset’s change in value
in the period.36 Current law already requires mark-to-market taxation in
specific circumstances.37 A general mark-to-market system, in contrast,
would tax a broader range of assets, for a broader class of taxpayers.38
Retrospective methods, in contrast, would wait until the time of a
realization event—as under current law—but then retroactively impute a
portion of the income (or loss) realized to prior years. These methods could
also be implemented generally for all assets, or specifically for particular
assets or asset classes. An annual rate of return could be imputed based on
the difference between the original cost, the value at the time of realization,
and the duration of the holding period.39 A retrospective method would not
necessarily need to account for the asset’s original basis. For example, one
method would simply observe the price realization upon a sale or disposition
“Revolutionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 733–40 (1992); Schenk, supra note
15, at 446–48.
33. See Glogower, supra note 15, at 159 n.266.
34. See generally Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments,
71 TEX. L. REV. 243, 283–330 (1992).
35. For example, if a taxpayer is “overtaxed” as a result of the imputed return to basis exceeding
the asset’s actual appreciation, the taxpayer will realize a corresponding loss upon the sale of the asset.
Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 32, at 736-37.
36. See generally, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through
Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1994); David S. Miller, A
Progressive System of Mark-to-Market Taxation, 121 TAX NOTES 213 (2008); David A. Weisbach, A
Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95 (1999).
37. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 475 (mark-to-market method for securities dealers); § 1256 (mark-to-market
method for certain derivatives investments).
38. See, e.g, Miller, supra note 36.
39. See generally Cynthia Blum, New Role for the Treasury: Charging Interest on Tax Deferral
Loans, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1998); Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax
Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1990); Christopher H. Hanna, The Virtual Reality of Eliminating Tax
Deferral, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 449 (1995); Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for
Retrospective Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 45 (1996).
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and impute a return to prior years, without regard to the asset’s cost.40
Proposals for retrospective methods typically also treat the taxpayer’s death
as a realization event, to prevent the deferral of gains indefinitely across
generations.41
Certain methods may be more or less amenable for certain assets or asset
classes. For example, the prospective expected value method would be
feasible for investments with a reasonably predictable investment period and
settlement value.42 Similarly, a mark-to-market system would be easiest to
implement for regularly traded securities with observable and relatively
reliable prices but would be more difficult for nontraded assets.43
Finally, policymakers can implement a combination of methods to
account for the different characteristics of certain asset classes and to take
advantage of the legal and administrative infrastructure of the current tax
system. For example, a system of mark-to-market for regularly traded assets
can be combined with a method of retrospective taxation for irregularly traded
assets.44 Similarly, a prospective method that taxes an imputed return to basis
can also be combined with a tax on any additional gain or loss upon
realization, either through the current realization rule system (which would
tax all the excess gain or loss in the year of realization)45 or through a
retrospective method (which would impute a portion of the excess gain or loss
to prior years).46
40. See generally Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
167 (1991). Professor Auerbach’s proposal can be understood as one application of a generalized
approach that would prospectively tax an imputed return to basis until a specified “gain reference date”
at which point the basis would be adjusted to account for the growth path suggested by the final
realization price. See David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and
Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731, 769–777 (1995)
(describing Professor Auerbach’s approach as a special case of this method where the gain reference
date is upon acquisition).
41. See Glogower, supra note 15, at 153; Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization
and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 6 (1992).
42. For an example of how this method is applied in current law, see the original issue discount
rules in I.R.C. §§ 1272–1275 (imputing annual interest income for bonds purchased at a discount to
the face value).
43. Glogower, supra note 15, at 129.
44. See, e.g., id. at 142–62 (the “deferred tax accounting” method); see also RON WYDEN, SENATE
FIN. COMM., TREAT WEALTH LIKE WAGES 10–22 (2019), https://www.finance.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/Treat%20Wealth%20Like%20Wages%20RM%20Wyden.pdf (recent proposal
for a similar hybrid system).
45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
46. Glogower, supra note 15, at 159–60 n.266 (suggesting that prospective taxation of an imputed
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C. A Wealth Tax
In recent years, policymakers have proposed a wealth tax as an alternative
direction for the progressive tax system.47 In principle, a wealth tax is
conceptually simpler than a capital income tax. Unlike a capital income tax,
which taxes a flow of income during the taxing period, a wealth tax would
instead tax the stock of a taxpayer’s wealth, as observed at a moment during
the taxing period.48 The wealth tax base is typically determined based on the
value of the taxpayer’s assets at the time of observation,49 but in principle
could also be determined based on the taxpayer’s “cost” or basis in the assets.
A broad-based wealth tax would account for a broad range of a taxpayer’s
assets, whereas a narrower wealth tax base would only account for certain
assets, that may be easier to value each taxing period.50 The base of a wealth
tax would also necessarily be calculated net of a taxpayer’s debt.51
A federal wealth tax would be largely unprecedented in the United
States,52 but variants of a wealth tax are more common in other countries as
well as in subfederal taxing jurisdictions. The real property tax common in
return to basis can be combined with retrospective taxation of residual gains or losses upon
realization).
47. These recent proposals have focused in particular on taxing high-end wealth. See Elizabeth
Warren, Senator, Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS https://elizabethwarren.com/
plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (proposing a wealth tax with rates of 2% and 6% on net wealth above $50
million); Bernie Sanders, Senator, Tax on Extreme Wealth, BERNIE SANDERS,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/tax-extreme-wealth/ (proposing a wealth tax with rates ranging from
2% to 8% on net wealth above $32 million). For prior wealth tax proposals in the literature, see BRUCE
ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 94–112 (1999); THOMAS PIKETTY,
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 515–18, 524–30 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014);
Moran, supra note 15, at 329–35; Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 15.
48. See OECD, supra note 15, at 16, 48. A taxpayer’s wealth stock can also be determined as an
average of multiple observations during the taxing period. See Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 15,
at 511 n.23.
49. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 47; Sanders, supra note 47.
50. For example, local property taxes can be understood as subfederal wealth taxes on a narrowly
defined tax base, with revenues typically designated to particular uses.
51. See Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 15, at 537. Reducing a broad wealth tax base by a
taxpayer’s liabilities is necessary to avoid unduly burdening a taxpayer with both highly valued assets
and large corresponding liabilities. See id. Netting out debt may not be necessary or desirable for a
narrower wealth tax base, such as a local property tax. See id.
52. During the Federal period, Congress did impose short-lived federal real estate taxes. See Bruce
Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24 (1999); Nicholas R. Parrillo, A
Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence
from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021)
(describing the administration of the 1798 tax on real estate).
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many local taxing jurisdictions53 can be understood as a narrow form of a
wealth tax, with a limited category of assets subject to tax and often with
dedicated uses for the revenues raised.54 Similarly, a number of foreign
jurisdictions have experimented with wealth taxes, with some realizing
greater success than others.55 For one example, Swiss citizens pay a wealth
tax that varies by canton and raises revenue roughly equal to approximately
1% of the country’s GDP.56
III. COMPARING CAPITAL INCOME AND WEALTH TAXES
Comparing the economic effects of capital income taxes and wealth taxes
first requires a consistent way to translate between the two reforms. This Part
introduces the concept of rate-equivalent capital income and wealth taxes and
illustrates how it can illuminate the assumptions behind comparisons of
wealth tax and capital income tax reforms in the literature. This Part also
examines the economic effects, administrability, and constitutionality of
wealth tax and capital income tax reforms. This discussion illustrates how, in
many cases, the differences between a capital income reform or a wealth tax
may be narrower than they might appear. Furthermore, this discussion
illustrates how in many cases the choice of how the reform is structured or the
baseline against which the reform is measured may be more consequential
than any innate differences between capital income and wealth taxes as
formally distinct categories.
A. Economic Effects and Rate-Equivalent Reforms
The literature observes that, in certain circumstances, a wealth tax and a
capital income tax can have equivalent economic effects to individual
taxpayers.57 By manipulating the definition of the taxable base, a wealth tax

53. See TAX POLICY CTR., TAX POLICY CENTER BRIEFING BOOK (last updated May 2020),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-do-state-and-local-property-taxes-work.
54. See Ari Glogower, A Constitutional Wealth Tax, 118 MICH. L. REV. 717, 744 n.199 (2020).
55. See OECD, supra note 15, at 16 (describing a decrease in the number of OECD countries using
wealth taxes from 1990 to 2017).
56. Id. at 18, 78. For a discussion of differences in the design of wealth taxes in Switzerland and
other countries, see id. at 76–95.
57. See, e.g., id. at 48–49; see also id. at 99 (describing a wealth tax as equivalent to a “proportional
tax on a presumptive return”). Capital income taxes and wealth taxes can also have different economic
effects in other scenarios that are not the focus of this Essay, and which may also depend on the
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can be reconfigured as a tax on an assumed return to the taxpayer’s assets,
which resembles a capital income tax. This Essay refers to such a wealth tax
yielding the same tax liability as under a capital income tax, for any fixed rate
of investment return, as the “rate-equivalent wealth tax” and its converse as
the “rate-equivalent capital income tax.” The Essay refers to the fixed rate of
investment return used for purposes of setting the rate equivalency among the
two taxes as the “reference investment return rate”
For a simple example, assume Wealth Holder 1 has $10,000 of wealth
which earns a 10% risk-free investment return each year, for a total annual
return of $1,000. A tax liability of $100 could be generated by either a 10%
tax on Wealth Holder 1’s $1,000 investment return under an annual capital
income tax,58 or a 1% tax on Wealth Holder 1’s $10,000 of assets at the
beginning of the period under a wealth tax.59 In this case, the economic effect
of the two rate-equivalent instruments would also not vary over time. For
example, under either instrument Wealth Holder 1 would have an ending
wealth balance of $23,673.64 after a period of ten years and would pay a total
tax of $1,519.25.
Of course, not all taxpayers and investments yield the same return. The
literature also describes the basic result that a capital income tax and its rateequivalent wealth tax would yield different tax liabilities in the case of a
taxpayer who earned a lower or a higher return than the reference investment
return rate.60 A wealth tax would impose a relatively higher burden on lowyield investments, whereas an accrual capital income tax would impose a
relatively higher burden on higher-yield investments.
For example, assume that Wealth Holder 2 and Wealth Holder 3 also each
have $10,000 of wealth at the beginning of the taxing period, but Wealth
Holder 2 earns no investment return and Wealth Holder 3 earns a 20%
investment return.61 Also assume that the reference investment return rate is
particular design of each tax instrument. For a discussion of the taxation of returns to risk under either
instrument, see Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 15, at 517–20 (discussing the taxation of returns to
risk under either instrument).
58. This illustration assumes that the annual capital income tax could accurately measure and tax
capital income earned each year.
59. The tax liability due under the single-period capital income tax will be calculated as Prt1 where
P is the wealth principal, r is annual investment return, and t1 is the capital income tax rate. The
liability due under the single-period wealth tax will be calculated as Pt2 where t2 is the wealth tax rate.
The two instruments will yield an equivalent tax liability where rt1= t2.
60. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 15, at 49; Leiserson, supra note 15, at 127.
61. For example, this higher return could result from economic rents or mischaracterized labor
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still Wealth Holder 1’s 10% investment return, and the capital income tax rate
is 10% and the rate-equivalent wealth tax rate is 1%.
A wealth tax imposes a greater burden on lower-yielding assets, as
compared to its rate-equivalent capital income tax. In this case, Wealth
Holder 2 would owe no tax at all under the capital income tax and would still
have the $1,000 balance at the end of the ten-year period. Under a wealth tax,
however, Wealth Holder 2 would still pay tax each year under a wealth tax,
for a total tax of $956.18 and an ending balance of $9,043.82 at the end of the
period. Conversely, a wealth tax will impose a lower burden on higher
yielding assets. For example, Wealth Holder 3—with an investment return
above Wealth Holder 1’s 10% reference investment return rate—would pay
$4,704 under the capital income tax and have an ending balance of
$52,338.36, and would pay only $2,470.89 under the rate-equivalent wealth
tax and would have a higher ending balance of $56,946.84.
These simple examples illustrate the central importance of the choice of
the investment return reference rate when comparing the individual-level
economic effects of wealth taxes and capital income taxes. More generally,
the use of the rate-equivalent tax and investment return reference rate concepts
can help bring consistency and specificity to comparisons of the two reforms.
The concept of rate-equivalent taxes can illuminate the assumptions
behind comparisons of wealth tax and capital income tax reforms in the
literature. For example, economist Jason Furman compares a hypothetical
capital income tax and wealth tax to argue that the former would be more
efficient and equitable than a wealth tax.62 His example considers the varying
effects of a 2% wealth tax and a 40% mark-to-market capital income tax for
two different taxpayers: an investor in risk-free Treasuries that yield a 2%
annual return, and an entrepreneur earning a 50% annual return predominantly
comprised of supernormal returns (which could be economic rents or
mischaracterized labor).63 Furman suggests that a capital income tax would
be preferable, since a wealth tax would both overburden the investor in

income. See supra note 23. For a discussion of the different possible components of investment
returns, see Ari Glogower & David Kamin, Missing the Mark: Evaluating the New Tax Preferences
for Business Income, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 789, 791 (2018).
62. Jason Furman, Harvard Kennedy School Professor of the Practice of Economic Policy,
Keynote Address at the Tax Policy Center Conference: Should the Tax System be Used to Reduce
Wealth Inequality in the United States? 10–11 (Jan. 16, 2020) (slides available at
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/furman_presentation_0.pdf ).
63. Id.
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Treasuries and under-tax the entrepreneur.64
The concept of rate-equivalent capital income and wealth taxes helps to
specify the assumptions underlying this example and the basis by which it
compares the two possible tax instruments. In this case, comparing a 2%
wealth tax and a 40% capital income tax implies a reference investment return
rate of 5%,65 which exceeds the Treasury investor’s return but is substantially
lower than the entrepreneur’s presumed return.
Choosing a lower reference investment return rate in setting the relative
wealth and capital income tax rates in this example, in contrast, would reduce
the degree by which the wealth tax overburdened the investor in Treasuries.
Of course, a lower reference investment return rate, however, could
compound the entrepreneur’s favorable treatment under the wealth tax. Three
additional considerations, however, could minimize the disparity between the
entrepreneur’s treatment under a capital income tax or a wealth tax. First,
while entrepreneurs can certainly amass large fortunes and earn supernormal
rents over a period of years,66 an individual is less likely to experience the
same compounded supernormal returns year over year for an extended period
of time.67 After this period, the variance between a capital income tax and its
rate-equivalent capital income tax would narrow, if the normal return
64. Others have argued that the effect of a wealth tax in imposing a relatively higher burden on
lower returns may also be beneficial by encouraging productive investment of capital and incentivizing
entrepreneurship. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 15, at 54–55; Fatih Guvenen, Gueorgui Kambourov,
Burhan Kuruscu, Sergio Ocampo & Daphne Chen, Use It or Lose It: Efficiency Gains from Wealth
Taxation 1 (Sept. 6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Washington Center for Equitable
Growth), https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/use-it-or-lose-it-efficiency-gains-from-wealthtaxation/; see also infra note 77 and accompanying text. Others argue, however, that a wealth tax
would not be the most efficient method of encouraging entrepreneurship or productive investment of
capital. See, e.g., Garret Watson, Proponents of Wealth Taxation Must Consider Its Impact on
Innovation, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/wealth-tax-economic-impact/
(arguing that a wealth tax is “a poorly targeted method to encourage greater innovation” since “owners
of wealth will be motivated to seek higher returns wherever they find them . . . not solely through
engaging in innovative activity”).
65. See supra note 59 (using the formula, 2% ÷ 40% = 5%).
66. See Colin Beresford, Elon Musk’s Net Worth Has Skyrocketed Over $100 Billion, CAR &
DRIVER (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a33860968/elon-musk-net-worth100billion/ (discussing how Tesla CEO Elon Musk’s estimated net worth increased by more than 400%
between August 2019 and August 2020, alongside a rise in Tesla’s stock). This rapid appreciation
could reflect a combination of a return to labor income, normal business returns, supernormal returns
resulting from the business activities and market position, and a pure windfall from investor
speculation.
67. That is, even if these higher returns reflect disguised labor, they would not be likely to
compound indefinitely over a long period.
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constitutes a greater proportion of the individual’s total investment return.
The example also presumes a constant positive investment return for both
taxpayers. Unlike a typical capital gains tax, a wealth tax would also generate
a positive net tax liability even in a year when the entrepreneur experiences
no gains, or even losses.68 As a result, the disparity between a wealth tax and
a capital income tax could narrow in the case of an entrepreneur who
experiences periods of both losses and gains. Finally, a wealth tax can be
structured with a varying rate schedule, which imposes higher rates on the
largest fortunes.69 In this case, a higher wealth tax rate on large fortunes would
also imply a higher investment return reference rate,70 which would similarly
minimize the disparity between the entrepreneur’s treatment under a capital
income tax or a wealth tax.71
Macroeconomic Effects. Beyond these individual-level consequences,
discussions of a wealth tax often focus on its anticipated macroeconomic
effects.72 Objections to a wealth tax frequently suggest that it would have
adverse or even disastrous consequences for economic growth. For example,
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin argued that under a wealth tax “[y]ou’re
going to completely disincentivize capital investment, which is going to be
very, very bad for economic growth.”73 In this case as well, however, the
assessment of a wealth tax will depend on whether the alternative baseline
would be current law or an improved capital income tax, and upon the
particular design features chosen for either the wealth tax or a capital income
tax reform.
Some studies anticipate significant adverse economic effects from a
wealth tax. For example, the Penn-Wharton Budget Model estimates that
Senator Warren’s wealth tax proposal74 would reduce total GDP by 1.1–2.1%
by 2050, depending on the uses of the wealth tax revenues.75 Other studies
68. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., supra note 47.
70. For example, increasing the wealth tax rate from 2% to 8% in the example supra note 65 and
accompanying text would imply increasing the investment return reference rate from 5% to 20%.
71. Of course, in this case, the higher wealth tax rate would also impose an even greater burden on
a taxpayer with wealth above the threshold but with lower-yield investments such as Treasuries.
72. See, e.g., Alan Rappeport & Thomas Kaplan, Democrats’ Plans to Tax Wealth Would Reshape
U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/politics/sanderswarren-wealthtax.html.
73. Id.
74. See Warren, supra note 47.
75. PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL, UNIV. OF PENN., SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN’S
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have reached different conclusions by highlighting the pro-growth potential
of a wealth tax. For example, economists Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel
Zucman argue that a wealth tax would increase savings by lower- and middleincome taxpayers or by the government sector (depending on the use of the
tax revenue) which would counter any reduction in capital stock resulting
from the tax.76 They also argue that a wealth tax could have a positive impact
on entrepreneurial innovation, by imposing a proportionally larger burden on
large and established businesses.77
These varying estimates of how a wealth tax would affect economic
growth depend upon a number of key assumptions. Adjusting these
assumptions can have significant effects on a wealth tax’s expected economic
effects. First, to the extent that a wealth tax is modeled in an open economy,
a reduction in U.S. capital stock would be replaced by foreign investment.78
The PWBM estimates that the U.S. economy is 40% open,79 and conventional
estimates range from approximately 30% to above 60%.80 Second, the
economic effects of a wealth tax will depend on assumptions as to both the
use of the tax revenues and the return to public investment. For example, the
PWBM bases its modeling upon an assumption that the revenues will be used
for deficit reduction or for public investments generating a 12% return, but
WEALTH TAX: BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 3–5 (Dec. 12, 2019), https://budgetmodel.
wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2019/12/12/senator-elizabeth-warrens-wealth-tax-projected-budgetary-and
-economic-effects [hereinafter PWBM] (estimating economic effects using alternative scenarios
where the tax revenues are used to reduce the deficit, fund nonproductive investments, or fund
productive investments); see also JOHN W. DIAMOND & GEORGE R. ZODROW, THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF WEALTH TAXES 21 tbl. 1 (CTR. FOR FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY 2020),
https://www.freedomandprosperity.org/files/White%20Paper/Diamond-Zodrow_Economic_Effects_
of_Wealth_Taxes.pdf (estimating an even larger 2.7% decline in GDP from Senator Warren’s
proposal). This model assumes all wealth tax revenues are used to finance transfer payments rather
than to reduce the deficit or for other public investments, and that these transfers do not themselves
generate significant economic growth. Id. at 23.
76. Saez & Zucman, supra note 15, at 438.
77. Id. at 439. Of course, under a wealth tax emerging businesses will also face a lower ex ante
after-tax financial payoff if they succeed. Id. Saez and Zucman argue, however, that large, established
businesses can also use their financial resources to protect their dominant position, and a wealth tax
could mitigate this effect. Id.
78. See id. at 37–38 (arguing in general the U.S. does operate as an open economy).
79. See generally PWBM, supra note 75, at 13 (assuming the U.S. economy is 40% open); see
also DIAMOND & ZODROW, supra note 75, at 9 (using an estimate of 43%).
80. See ALAN D. VIARD, WEALTH TAXATION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 180 (THE ASPEN
INST. 2019), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Wealth-Taxation-An-Overview-ofthe-Issues-Revised-Nov-9-2019.pdf?x88519 (discussing the biggest concerns of the Warren-Sanders
wealth tax).
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also finds that the sign of the wealth tax’s economic effects would flip, and
the wealth tax would increase GDP if the revenues raised funded public
investments with a return of 15% or more.81
In this case as well, the anticipated macroeconomic effects of a wealth tax
should be evaluated in the context of possible alternatives, including the
baseline of current law and a rate-equivalent capital income tax reform. Of
course, a capital income tax can also have the effect of burdening domestic
savings and can also generate revenue to fund productive public investments
or to increase savings by lower-income taxpayers.82 In this respect, the
general objections to a wealth tax as “very bad for economic growth”83 might
just as easily be levied against an improved capital income tax.84 In either
case, the anticipated effects will depend upon the particular design of the
instruments, the rates adopted under either instrument, and the uses of the
revenues generated. Furthermore, policymakers could compare the economic
effects of reform alternatives consistently by comparing the effects of a wealth
tax with those of its rate-equivalent capital income tax, with more fine-grained
comparisons made by evaluating the effects for different reference investment
returns rates and progressive rate schedules.85 As described above, when
compared to its rate-equivalent capital income tax, a wealth tax may in fact
81. PWBM, supra note 75, at 9, 13 n.7. Other studies suggest that public investment could yield
even higher returns, which could correspondingly increase the positive economic effects from a wealth
tax. See, e.g., JOSH BIVENS, PUBLIC INVESTMENT: THE NEXT ‘NEW’ THING FOR POWERING
ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., 2012) (arguing that rates of return on certain public
investments can reach 15% to 30%). Diamond and Zodrow’s model, in contrast, assumes that the
revenues are used for transfers that do not generate any public investment return. DIAMOND &
ZODROW, supra note 75, at 23. They note that the economic effects of a wealth tax would be “less
negative” if the revenues were used to fund public investments with a positive return. Id.; c.f. Leiseron,
supra note 15, at 125 (describing possible spillover benefits from public spending funded by a wealth
tax).
82. See, e.g., Eric Toder & Kim Rueben, Should We Eliminate Taxation of Capital Income, in
TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 89, 127–29 (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle,
eds., 2007) (describing empirical studies on the effect of capital income taxes on private savings).
83. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
84. For arguments that a moderate capital income tax would also not significantly reduce
investment and economic growth, see CHRIS WILLIAM SANCHIRICO, DO CAPITAL INCOME TAXES
HINDER GROWTH?, Penn. WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE 2 (2013), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2222843 (describing uncertainty in both theoretical models and empirical studies on the
effects of capital income taxation on savings, the potential compensating effects of foreign investment,
and the potential adverse economic effects of labor income taxes and increased government
borrowing).
85. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting progressive rate schedules could also imply
different reference return rates for taxpayers at varying wealth and income levels).
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encourage greater economic investment and growth.86
Finally, even if a wealth tax or capital income tax reform did in fact result
in some reduction in economic growth, these economic effects could be
justified on account of the distributive benefits from these reforms. For
example, even objections to a wealth tax based on anticipated adverse
economic effects concede that lower-income taxpayers could still receive a
significant net benefit from a wealth tax, depending again on the use of the
funds.87 In this case the redistributive benefits to lower-income taxpayers
from either a wealth tax or an improved capital income tax could outweigh
economic costs borne by other taxpayers.
B. Administration and Avoidance
Objections to a wealth tax also often highlight the administrative
challenges and avoidance opportunities88 it would present.89 In this case as
well, however, an improved capital income tax could face many of these same
obstacles. At the same time, policymakers would be able to address these
concerns, often through similar anti-avoidance measures. Furthermore,
possible imperfections in the implementation of either a wealth tax or an
improved capital income tax should be evaluated in the context of the much
more serious failings of the current income tax to accurately measure and tax
income.90 That is, the current income tax also encounters many of these same
tax avoidance opportunities, which it only avoids in part through concessions
that significantly undermine its efficacy and revenue-raising potential.
Valuation. Objections to a wealth tax often point to the challenge in
valuing non-traded assets—such as real estate, art, and interests in closely held
businesses—and both the administrative difficulties and avoidance

86. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., DIAMOND & ZODROW, supra note 75 (finding that wealth would increase for the
lowest earning 30% of taxpayers even under their model anticipating a significant reduction in GDP
resulting from the wealth tax).
88. For purposes of this Essay, avoidance refers to tax reduction strategies or opportunities that
arise from the tax rules, which may be contrasted with evasion in clear violation of the law.
89. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers & Natasha Sarin, Opinion, A ‘Wealth Tax’ Presents A
Revenue Estimation Puzzle, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/04/04/wealth-tax-presents-revenue-estimation-puzzle/ (presuming that a wealth tax
would be susceptible to many of the same tax avoidance strategies as the current estate tax).
90. See supra Section II.A.
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opportunities this challenge would present.91 The valuation of liquid or nontraded assets poses similar challenges for both a wealth tax and an improved
capital income tax, depending how the latter is structured.92 In particular, both
a mark-to-market and a retrospective capital income tax that treat the
taxpayer’s death as a realization event93 would face a similar challenge in
valuing illiquid or irregularly traded assets. In addition to the administrative
challenge, valuation difficulties may also enable avoidance by taxpayers, who
would have an incentive to understate the value of assets to minimize their
current tax liabilities.94
The same possible solutions to valuation challenges could be
implemented in either a wealth tax or an improved capital income tax. For
example, both instruments could use a retrospective system for hard-to-value
assets—that defers observation of asset values until a realization event—to
both alleviate administrative burdens and reduce taxpayers’ opportunity to
benefit by strategically underreporting asset values.95
Under either
instrument, an interest charge could be retroactively imposed with respect to
tax liabilities attributable to prior tax periods, to counteract the incentive to

91. See, e.g., Robert Frank, The Problem with a Wealth Tax, WALL ST. J. (Jan 11, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-WHB-4976 (arguing that a wealth tax, in contrast to an income tax,
has a “fatal flaw: valuation” and that “[d]etermining a rich person’s precise net worth is difficult even
for the wealthy themselves, let alone the government”).
92. See, e.g., Glogower, supra note 15, at 128–29 (describing similar avoidance opportunities
under an accrual capital income tax). In some cases, a taxpayer can achieve the same tax savings by
undervaluing assets by the same amount under either a wealth tax or an accrual capital income tax.
See Hemel, supra note 15, at 766.
93. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Of course, a retrospective capital income tax that
treats the taxpayer’s death at a realization event would only require unsold assets to be valued on this
one occasion. As described infra notes 99–101, the need for more frequent valuations could in fact
make these valuations more easy to administer, rather than more difficult.
94. For a comparison of valuation challenges under the current estate tax and a wealth tax, see
Jason Oh & Eric Zolt, Wealth Tax Design: Lessons From Estate Tax Avoidance 21 (Univ. Cal. L.A.
Sch. Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 20-01, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3526515. A wealth tax would also impose a lower rate of tax on a broader base, as
compared with a capital income tax. For this reason, under a wealth tax a taxpayer would realize less
benefit from understating the amount of their wealth by a fixed dollar amount, as compared to the
benefit they would receive by understating their capital income by the same amount under a capital
income tax. As a result, in some circumstances a taxpayer may have less incentive to understate their
taxable base under a wealth tax.
95. For examples of a retrospective system for a capital income tax, see, e.g., the methods proposed
in Glogower, supra note 15, at 146–47, and WYDEN supra note 44. For discussion of a retrospective
system for a wealth tax, see Leiserson, supra note 15, at 105–07 (describing and evaluating a
“realization-based wealth tax.”).
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defer a realization event.96 The interest charge could also discourage
taxpayers from deferring realization under either instrument in the hope that
lower tax rates or different tax rules will be introduced in subsequent years.97
Finally, either an improved capital income tax or a wealth tax would
generate new data which could, in turn, facilitate enforcement, enable more
accurate valuations, and discourage avoidance through underreporting asset
values.98 Either instrument could yield new data on the annual fluctuations in
asset values which are not observed or recorded under the current tax system.99
A wealth tax or an improved income tax which observes annual changes in
asset values could yield significant new data each year, but even a realizationbased reform could still encourage more realizations by reducing the benefit
to avoiding realization, which could in turn also yield more data on asset
valuations.100
These data would in turn enable the IRS to more easily detect reporting
outliers or systemically low asset valuations. Although some arguments in
the literature assume that tax avoidance would increase over time under a
wealth tax, the benefits of increased data collection suggest why the opposite
effects may occur, and some of the most prominent tax avoidance
opportunities may in fact diminish over time.101
96. See Glogower, supra note 15, at 154–55. Alternatively, either instrument could also allow or
require estimated tax payments each year, as an alternative to the interest charge. See id. at 143–46
(describing a prepayment option for a capital income tax); Leiserson, supra note 15, at 106 (estimated
tax payment for a realization-based wealth tax).
97. For a discussion of how the expectation of future rate reductions can encourage taxpayers to
defer realization, see David Kamin & Jason S. Oh, The Effects of Capital Gains Rate Uncertainty on
Realization (Univ. Cal. L.A. Sch. Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 19-06 (2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365305.
98. Some forms of an improved capital income tax could offer built-in protections against
underreporting asset values. See Hemel, supra note 15, at 766 (arguing that “a mark-to-market income
tax incorporates a backstop against undervaluation: the tax benefit from undervaluation is recaptured
at the time of an arm’s-length sale”). A wealth tax which observes asset values every year could also
include adjustments to account for undervaluation by the taxpayer in prior years. In this case, a
taxpayer seeking to avoid a wealth tax liability would also have to continue to underreport the asset’s
value year after year, and the IRS would have multiple opportunities to enforce accurate valuation.
Certain capital income tax reforms, such as a broad mark-to-market system, could also correct in
subsequent years for undervaluation in prior years.
99. Glogower, supra note 15, at 165–66.
100. That is, even if policymakers preserve a realization-based system for hard-to-value assets under
either a wealth tax or a capital income tax, as described supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text, an
accompanying interest charge would discourage taxpayers from deferring realization events. As a
result, even such a system could yield data resulting from more frequent realization events.
101. See, e.g., PWBM, supra note 75, at 11 (assuming that tax avoidance of a wealth tax increases
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Debt Abuse. Other objections to a wealth tax argue that taxpayers could
reduce their wealth tax base by inflating their debt reported for tax purposes.102
In this case as well, however, the strategic use of debt could present similar
tax avoidance opportunities under current law and under an improved capital
income tax. For example, under current law taxpayers can use acquisition
debt to inflate their cost-basis in assets in order to benefit from cost recovery
deductions, even if the taxpayer does not bear an economic liability from the
debt.103 Both courts and the IRS have developed strategies to combat such
abuse, such as inquiries into whether the debt has real economic substance or
should be ignored for tax purposes.104
The current income tax also backstops these anti-abuse rules with
provisions limiting the amount of losses an individual can claim from business
activities. For example, the “at-risk” rules limit the amount of deductible
losses from a business activity to a measure of the taxpayer’s net economic
investment,105 and the passive activity rules limit deductible losses from
businesses in which the taxpayer does not actively participate.106 Similarly,
the partnership tax rules prevent partners from claiming basis with respect to
debt for which the partner does not bear the economic risk of loss.107
Variations of these same rules can also prevent the strategic use of debt
to reduce tax liabilities under a wealth tax. For example, the ability to net out
liabilities under a wealth tax could require similar inquiries into whether the
debt has real economic substance, or whether the taxpayer bears an economic
risk of loss with respect to the liability. More generally, these same general
problems manifest similarly under current law, and present similar challenges
and possible solutions under a wealth tax or an improved capital income tax.
significantly over the first five years of implementation and citing evidence that avoidance responses
“grow for a few years before plateauing”). This approach assumes, in effect, that taxpayers are likely
to grow more proficient over time at avoiding taxes, but that the IRS would not be likely to grow more
proficient over time at preventing such avoidance.
102. See, e.g., Chris Edwards, Taxing Wealth and Capital Income, 85 TAX & BUDGET BULL. CATO
INST. 1, 2 (August 1, 2019) (arguing that a wealth tax will encourage taxpayers to “underreport assets
and overreport debt”).
103. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 309 (1983) (affirming that nonrecourse liabilities are
also included in both a taxpayer’s basis and “the amount realized upon disposition”).
104. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Mitchell
M. Gans, Re-Examining The Sham Doctrine: When Should An Overpayment Be Reflected In Basis?,
30 BUFF. L. REV. 95, 105 (1981).
105. I.R.C. § 465 (2018).
106. I.R.C. § 469 (2018).
107. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1, 1.752-2, 1.752-3 (2019).
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The potential tax savings from using debt would vary in the case of a
wealth tax, which could affect the relative incentives for taxpayers to engage
in aggressive tax planning using debt under the different tax instruments. In
the case of an income tax, the taxpayer could only achieve a timing benefit
from increasing tax basis with debt, unless the taxpayer used other strategies
to avoid the realization of additional income when the debt is transferred or
cancelled.108 In some cases, however, the advantages of using debt to create
basis may be even greater under a capital income tax than they would be under
a wealth tax. Under an income tax, in many cases taxpayers can carry net
losses backwards or forwards to other taxable years.109 Under a wealth tax, in
contrast, debt could only be used to reduce the net wealth value in the current
year, and would not benefit a taxpayer who does not have a positive base of
wealth in that year.110
C. Constitutionality
Some objections to a wealth tax argue that an improved capital income
tax would be more likely to be found constitutional than would a wealth tax,
notwithstanding their similar economic effects.111 Under this logic, Congress
could achieve comparable economic results through a capital income tax to
those it could achieve through a wealth tax, with less risk that the reform could
be ruled unconstitutional.112
There may not be such a clear and simple divide, however, in evaluating
the constitutionality of a wealth tax and an improved capital income tax,

108. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983).
109. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 172 (deduction for net operating loss carryovers and carrybacks); § 1211
(capital loss carrybacks and carryovers); § 1256 (mark-to-market method for certain derivatives
investments).
110. Debt resulting in a negative wealth tax liability could still benefit the taxpayer if a wealth tax
similarly allowed taxpayers to “carryover” net negative wealth in one year to offset net positive wealth
in a subsequent year.
111. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Not So Fast: The Hidden Difficulties of Taxing Wealth, in
WEALTH 261, 284–85 (Jack Knight & Melissa Schwartzberg eds., 2017); Erik M. Jensen, The
Constitution Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 829–30 (2003); Daniel Hemel & Rebecca
Kysar, The Big Problem with Wealth Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/11/07/opinion/wealth-tax-constitution.html.
112. See, e.g., Hemel, supra note 15, at 769–72 (arguing that the constitutional uncertainty is highest
for a wealth tax, low for a mark-to-market capital income tax, and “fairly rounded to zero” for a
retrospective capital income tax).
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depending again on how the capital income tax reform would be structured.113
The literature offers robust arguments as to why a federal wealth tax would
be constitutional. At the same time, capital income tax reforms could face
constitutional risks similar to those faced by a wealth tax.
Article I, Section VIII of the Constitution grants Congress a broad “Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States . . . .”114 The “apportionment requirement” in Article I, Section II and
Article I, Section IX, however, requires that any “direct” tax must be
apportioned among the states according to their respective populations.115
Because it would require a proportionally higher tax burden on a relatively
poorer but more populous state, the apportionment requirement is commonly
understood to preclude any modern progressive federal tax which is subject
to the requirement.116
Arguments that a federal wealth tax would be unconstitutional typically
focus on elements of the historical record suggesting that the founders
considered a wealth tax to be a form of “direct tax” that should be
apportioned.117 One difficulty with this approach, however, is the diversity of
conflicting statements and views in the historical record, which complicate
the project of determining either the term’s contemporaneous common public
meaning or its subjective meaning to the founders. For example, Professor
Erik Jensen—who generally argues for a broad reading of the term “direct
taxes” that would preclude a federal wealth tax—nonetheless concedes that

113. This Essay focuses on descriptive analysis of the constitutionality of a wealth tax or an
improved capital income tax, which may be distinguishable from predictive analysis of what
arguments might resonate with a Supreme Court if it were hostile to a broad federal taxing power. As
described in this Section, any particular Supreme Court justices could find grounds to uphold or strike
down either a wealth tax or an improved income tax.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This broad federal taxing power replaced the ineffective system
under the Articles of Confederation, whereby Congress could requisition funds from the states. See
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII, ¶¶ 1–2; id. art. IX, ¶ 5.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. This requirement would not apply to a
subfederal wealth tax, such as a local property tax assessment.
116. See Glogower, supra note 54, at 720; but see John R. Brooks & David Gamage, Why A Wealth
Tax Is Definitely Constitutional (Jan. 9, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3489997&download=yes (arguing that an apportioned wealth tax combined
with a system of “fiscal equalization program” with the states to mitigate its regressive effects would
be feasible).
117. See, e.g., infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text.
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the interpretation of the term is obscured by a “fuzzy historical record.”118
The seriatim opinions in the formative early Supreme Court case of
Hylton v. United States119 suggested that the direct tax definition should be
read narrowly to include only real property and possibly personal property.120
More importantly, the opinions suggest that the apportionment requirement
was not intended to restrain the federal taxing power, and that its scope should
be interpreted in light of this intent.121
Professors Bruce Ackerman and Calvin Johnson consequently argue that
the apportionment requirement should not inhibit a federal wealth tax.122
Professor Ackerman argues that the apportionment requirement should be
understood as an ambiguous concession in a compromise between northern
and southern states over the representation of persons held in slavery, but that
it did not represent any broader principles of fiscal policy or federalism.123
Professor Johnson argues even more broadly that apportionment should be
understood as a mistake that the founders did not even understand, and should
never be interpreted as a “hobble” to the federal taxing power.124
Other scholars argue that the direct tax definition should be read broadly
to preclude an unapportioned wealth tax. Professor Erik Jensen argues that—
notwithstanding the fuzzy historical record—the term “direct tax” should be
defined broadly as all “unavoidable” taxes, and that the founders intended for
the apportionment requirement to limit Congress’s power with respect to such
taxes.125 Professors Daniel Hemel and Rebecca Kysar similarly argue that a
118. Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2414 (1997).
119. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1976).
120. Id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
121. See id. at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.) (holding that the Constitution granted Congress “a general
power . . . without any restraint” and that it would only require apportionment of taxes when it could
“reasonably apply”).
122. Ackerman, supra note 52, at 56–58; Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The
Foul-Up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 30 (1998); see generally
Dawn Johnsen & Walter Dellinger, The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax, 93 IND. L.J. 111
(2018).
123. Ackerman, supra note 52, at 7–13; id. at 58 (“Given the Reconstruction Amendments, there is
no longer a constitutional point in enforcing a lapsed bargain with the slave power.”). Ackerman
argues that, even if the direct tax definition is construed to require apportionment for real estate, a
broader wealth tax that includes real property should still not be subject to this requirement, since it
would be qualitatively different from a tax on real property alone. Id. at 56–58.
124. Johnsen, supra note 122, at 14–24.
125. Jensen, supra note 118, at 2356, 2377–79; Jensen, supra note 111, at 829; Erik M. Jensen,
Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENT.
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“wealth tax[] would very likely be classified by courts as [a] direct tax[]”
requiring apportionment.126 They argue that even Alexander Hamilton—who
generally held a broad view of the federal taxing power—believed that a tax
on real estate or on an individual’s property would be a direct tax.127
The statements of Alexander Hamilton, however, exemplify the challenge
of drawing conclusions from an ambiguous, and at times contradictory,
historical record. For example, even as Hamilton stated that a tax on real
estate would be a direct tax, he also argued that the distinction between direct
and indirect taxes is “uncertain and vague” with no “antecedent settled legal
meaning.”128 Perhaps even more importantly, Hamilton also argued that the
direct tax definition should not be interpreted in a manner that would restrain
the federal taxing power129 or that would result in an “absurd” result that
would limit the federal power to enact any particular form of tax.130 Finally,
the interpretation and reconciliation of Hamilton’s arguments is further
complicated by the fact that he adopted internally inconsistent positions131 and
evidently believed that an apportioned tax on real estate was feasible,132 which
likely explains why he argued in the first instance that a tax on real estate
would be a direct tax.
The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, provided that Congress could
tax income without apportionment, irrespective of whether an income tax is
categorized as a direct tax or not.133 The Amendment did not define, however,
exactly what constituted income for these purposes.134 As a result, ambiguity
in the scope of the term “income” leaves uncertain the limits of Congress’s
power to define the income tax base.
355, 367 (2004); Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses,
15 J.L. & POL. 687, 691 (1999).
126. See Hemel & Kysar, supra note 111.
127. Id.
128. Brief for United States, Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), reprinted in 8
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 378, 378–79 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
129. Id. at 380 (“It would be contrary to reason . . . to adopt a principle for regulating the exercise
of a clear constitutional power which would defeat the exercise of the power.”).
130. Id. at 380–81.
131. For a discussion of the inconsistency of Hamilton’s views and writings on the direct tax
definition, see Jensen, supra note 118, at 2360.
132. Brief for the United States, supra note 128.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Sixteenth Amendment also did not address whether Congress
could also tax another base—such as wealth—without apportionment. See Glogower, supra note 54,
at 740.
134. See Glogower, supra note 54, at 740.
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Because of the uncertainty as to the scope of the Sixteenth Amendment,
a reform to improve the taxation of capital income could also be subject to
constitutional challenge, depending how it would be structured. The Supreme
Court precedent suggests that a mark-to-market reform, which simply
eliminated the realization rule, would most likely be constitutional under the
Sixteenth Amendment. This method would still tax a base of a taxpayer’s
income each year, as measured by the change in asset values each year, only
without waiting for a realization event as a prerequisite for generating a tax
liability. The Court has held that the realization rule is not a constitutional
requirement,135 and many current tax rules already tax income in exactly this
manner.136
The analysis grows less certain, however, in the case of other possible
income tax reforms. A realization-based retrospective method that still taxes
the difference between a taxpayer’s amount realized and basis in the asset, but
simply imposed an interest charge to account for the timing of the gains,137
would almost certainly be constitutional as well, as structurally comparable to
the current income tax.
Other possible capital income tax reforms—with a structure even closer
to that of a wealth tax—could similarly face greater constitutional uncertainty.
For example, a retrospective method that does not account for the taxpayer’s
basis or that picks an arbitrary basis, and simply accounts for a taxpayer’s
asset value138 upon either a realization event or the taxpayer’s death would be
structurally equivalent to a wealth tax.139 In this case, the only differences
135. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1940) (requiring a lessor to include in gross
income the value of a building repossessed by a lessee and prior to a disposition of the building);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940) (describing realization as a rule of “administrative
convenience” rather than a constitutional requirement).
136. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 475 (2018) (mark-to-market rules for dealers in securities), § 1272 (requiring
inclusion of interest income prior to disposition in the case of original issue discount). Whether the
Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality of a mark-to-market reform, however, is not entirely
free from doubt. See Murphy v. United States, 992 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1993). In Murphy, the
Ninth Circuit upheld a tax on unrealized gains under section 1256 under a “constructive receipt”
principle, but declined to suggest whether Congress could tax unrealized gains in the absence of a
constructive receipt. Id.
137. See, e.g., the methods described supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., note 40 and accompanying text (describing Professors Auerbach and Bradford’s
proposed methods for a retrospective capital income tax).
139. David Bradford argues that Professor Auerbach’s method would tax an imputed gain,
regardless of whether the taxpayer experienced an actual gain or loss. Bradford, supra note 40, at 777
n.51. In effect, this method can be understood as “reconstructing” an imputed basis in the asset, based
solely upon the value at realization, the holding period, and the imputed rate of return. Id. This
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between these methods and a wealth tax would be the formula used to
calculate the tax liability due for a given asset value, the periodicity of the tax,
and its formal characterization as either a tax on wealth or capital income.
A capital income tax that treats death as a realization event could face
other constitutional challenges. Scholars have argued that a retrospective
system that treats death as a realization event would face essentially zero
constitutional risk, as it would be similar to an estate tax.140 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has upheld transfer taxes, at death or otherwise, as excises that
are not subject to apportionment.141 In these cases, however, the transfer
arising from the death—rather than the event of the taxpayer’s death alone—
forms the basis for the constitutional analysis.142 That is, these cases do not
suggest that the tax is indirect simply by virtue of the occurrence at death. If
this were the case, then a taxpayer might argue that any other occurrence—
such as the arrival of the midnight hour—could similarly form a permissible
basis for taxation.
For this reason, a retrospective tax imposed at the time of a taxpayer’s
death would not necessarily benefit from any additional constitutional
support, beyond the general holdings suggesting that realization is not a
constitutional requirement in all events. Of course, Congress could attempt
to characterize the realization-at-death rule in a retrospective tax as a form of
an estate tax, since it would share similarities with an estate tax—albeit with
a more complex method of calculating the resulting tax liability—but this
recharacterization may not assist the constitutional analysis if the rule is in
fact designed as an element of the income tax. Drawing constitutional
distinctions in this case might appear purely formal, but formalist
interpretations of the constitutional provisions also form the basis for the
arguments that a wealth tax would be unconstitutional in the first place.143

analysis illustrates the economic similarities between any wealth tax (which similarly applies a
formula to a taxpayer’s asset value) and a nominal tax on income that operates similarly by imputing
an amount of income and a corresponding basis.
140. See Hemel, supra note 15, at 769; id. at 769, 771 (“A retrospective capital gains tax, by
contrast, fits snugly within the Supreme Court’s definition of taxes that need not be apportioned among
the states.”).
141. See Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 331 (1874); see also Bromley v. McCaughn, 280
U.S. 124, 135–36 (1929) (upholding a gift tax under a similar logic, as a tax on the transfer of the
property rather on the mere holding of property).
142. See Scholey, 90 U.S. at 347 (“[T]he succession or devolution of the real estate is the subjectmatter of the tax or duty.”).
143. See Glogower, supra note 54, at 780–83.
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Once the rationale for the Court’s reasoning for upholding transfer taxes at
death falls away and does not apply to a retrospective tax imposed at the time
of a taxpayer’s death, the constitutional analysis of such a tax and a wealth tax
would be less readily distinguishable.
A capital income tax calculated as an imputed return to the taxpayer’s
basis144 would also be structurally comparable to a wealth tax, with the only
differences being the choice of basis or net asset value as the starting variable
for calculating the tax liability, and the formula used to translate this starting
variable into a tax liability. Unlike mark-to-market taxation, however, this
method would tax presumed, rather than observed, income. For this reason,
it could be understood as one further step removed from the definition of
income in the Sixteenth Amendment and more structurally similar to a wealth
tax. Of course, this method could also allow for a correction upon realization,
to ensure that over time the taxpayer is only taxed on the total gain or loss
actually experienced.145 It is unclear, however, to what extent the Sixteenth
Amendment grants Congress the power to tax notional income in a certain
year that the taxpayer does not experience, even if Congress provides a
notional offsetting loss in a subsequent year.146
The innate ambiguities in the definition of income under the Sixteenth
Amendment also leave Congress opportunities to replicate the economic
effects of a wealth tax through the income tax in a manner that would further
confound the constitutional distinctions between income and wealth taxes.147
144. See, e.g., supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
146. See U.S. Const. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration.”). The current income tax rules already provide for the notional
taxes of income and losses in years other than those in which they are experienced to account for
particular challenges that arise in measuring income. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (as
amended in 2004) (providing rules for the taxation of notional income in the form of a “qualified
income offset”). On the other hand, it is uncertain whether the Sixteenth Amendment should be
interpreted to grant Congress the power to simply declare that a taxpayer has taxable income of $100
in Year 1 and will receive an offsetting tax loss or deduction of $100 in Year 10, if the taxpayer in fact
has no taxable economic activity in these years. See, e.g., United States v. Singer, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
111 (1872). In U.S. v. Singer, the court considered a tax on distilled spirits that set a floor of taxable
spirits at 80% of the distillery’s production capacity. Id. The taxpayer objected that a tax on
production capacity could amount to a tax “levied upon nothing” in the case of a nonproductive
distillery, much like a tax on a presumed return to basis. Id. at 116. In this case, the Court upheld the
tax, but on the narrow grounds that the minimum tax simply served as a backstop to the normal income
tax, as an anti-abuse rule to prevent taxpayers from evading tax by hiding their production. Id. at 120.
147. See generally Glogower, supra note 54, at 739–40.
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For example, Congress could implement a wealth-adjusted income tax, where
a taxpayer’s wealth affects the total income tax liability due, in the same
manner that any number of exogenous taxpayer attributes affect income tax
liabilities under current law.148 In a similar manner, the Court has upheld
Congress’s ability to deny or delay cost recovery deductions under the income
tax,149 which also has the effect of taxing wealth, albeit without formally
labeling the tax as such.
These considerations do not suggest that the Court would or should find
a capital income tax to be unconstitutional as well. Rather, this discussion
illustrates how, in the case of the constitutional analysis as well, the difference
between a wealth tax and capital income tax reforms may be less significant
or simple than it initially appears. Furthermore, the question of how a capital
income tax reform is structured may be just as consequential as its formal
labeling as an income tax. More generally, these considerations illustrate the
problems with adopting a rigid or formalistic approach to the constitutional
analysis of capital income and wealth tax taxes, and with the assumption that
Congress has clear authority to tax one but not the other.
IV. TAXING CAPITAL INCOME AND WEALTH IN A PROGRESSIVE TAX
SYSTEM
This Part describes the circumstances when an improved capital income
tax or a wealth tax would unambiguously differ as different measures for
comparing taxpayers in a progressive tax system, depending on how the role
of the progressive tax base is understood. As described in Part III, both an
improved capital income tax and a wealth tax share many commonalities in
their economic effects, administrability, and constitutional analysis, and these
considerations may depend more on the particular structures of the reforms
contemplated. As a result, policymakers should not reach categorical
conclusions that one reform direction is intrinsically more desirable than the
148. See id. at 752–58 (describing various methods for “wealth integration,” whereby a taxpayer’s
wealth affects the tax liability due on the taxpayer’s base of taxable income).
149. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(c), (e)–(f) (disallowing deduction for illegal payments, lobbying costs,
and fines and penalties); Glogower, supra note 54, at 741–43. Professor Joseph Dodge argues that it
would be inconsistent for the Sixteenth Amendment to require some forms of cost recovery deductions
in calculating taxable income while allowing Congress to deny other types of cost recovery deductions.
See Joseph M. Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation to the Taxation of NonExcludable Personal Injury Awards, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 369, 392 (2007) (“The constitutional text offers
no basis for distinguishing some costs of producing income from others.”).
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other based on these considerations alone.
Aside from the considerations, the choice between the two instruments
also may not matter if policymakers’ general goal is to increase tax
progressivity by raising taxes on the wealthiest taxpayers. Both an improved
capital income tax and a wealth tax would have the mechanical effect of
increasing the overall tax burden on the wealthiest taxpayers. This basic
similarity would imply a general agnosticism as to which reform would be
more desirable from a normative perspective, leaving policymakers to weigh
the two reforms based on the various considerations described in Part II above.
The fact that policymakers could raise more tax revenue from the
wealthiest taxpayers under either reform, however, still leaves unanswered a
predicate question of which taxpayers should pay relatively more or less in
taxes. Answering this question will depend on normative assumptions as to
the measure of inequality that the tax system should mitigate, and therefore
how taxpayers should be compared in a progressive tax system. This question
also has implications for whether the progressive tax base has a role in
articulating this basis for comparing taxpayers.
There is no conclusive answer to the question of what measure of
inequality policymakers should adopt for redistributive policy. For the same
reason, there is also no conclusive answer to the question of how taxpayers
should be compared in a progressive tax system. If the progressive tax system
is understood to have a purpose of mitigating differences in both income and
wealth, then a capital income tax and a wealth tax would measure these
differences across taxpayers differently. As a result, an improved capital
income tax and a wealth tax would serve different roles in comparing
taxpayers, even if they may have similar effects as mechanical instruments for
generating a larger tax burden on the wealthiest taxpayers.
A. Comparing Taxpayers in a Progressive Tax System
The Functions of the Progressive Tax Base. The progressive tax base
serves two distinct functions. First, the tax base serves a mechanical function,
as one of the variables used to determine tax liabilities. In previous work, I
have referred to this function of the tax base as the “calculating” function of
the base.150 For a very simple example, Section 1 of the Code calculates tax
liabilities by applying the applicable tax rates to the taxpayer’s base of taxable

150. Glogower, supra note 11, at 1461.
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income.151
The progressive tax base also serves as a basis for comparing taxpayers
in a progressive tax system, and therefore determines how much more or less
they should pay in tax as compared to other taxpayers. In this respect, the tax
base also embeds a normative, as well as a mechanical, dimension. For
example, in the federal income tax the amount of the taxpayer’s taxable
income determines her applicable rate brackets, and higher income taxpayers
generally pay tax at proportionally higher rates.152 In previous work, I have
referred to this normative function of the tax base as the “comparing” function
of the base.153
Ability to Pay and Measures of Inequality. The comparing function of
the progressive tax base orders taxpayers based on their relative “ability to
pay.”154 The definition of the term “ability to pay” will depend upon
normative choices as to the proper basis for comparing taxpayers and the
measure of inequality that the progressive tax system should mitigate.155 For
example, under one view taxpayers should be compared on the basis of their
endowments or earning ability, and income serves as a partial but imperfect
signal of endowment.156 Under a view of distributive justice that would
instead compare taxpayers on the basis of their ex-post economic outcomes—
rather than their ex ante opportunities—ability to pay would instead measure
taxpayers’ relative economic circumstances.157 From this perspective, ability
151. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(d), (j). Of course, many additional factors also affect the taxpayer’s final tax
liability, such as the filing status and availability of credits.
152. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(d), (j). Of course, progressive adjustments to account can also be implemented
through tax rules other than the rate schedule, such as rules defining the taxable base and available
credits.
153. Glogower, supra note 11, at 1461.
154. Id. This Essay does not consider the independent case for progressive taxes under an
alternative benefit theory of fairness in taxation. See Richard A Musgrave, Fairness in Taxation, in
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX POLICY, 135, 135 (Joseph J. Cordes et al., eds., 2005).
155. See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 459
n.173 (2000) (“This phrase [‘ability to pay’] is intended as a mere notation for the idea that taxpayers
should not bear the revenue burden equally; that is, some taxpayers are able to, and therefore should,
shoulder a larger tax burden than others.”).
156. See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark, Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objections
to Endowment Taxation, 18 CAN. J. LAW & JUR. 47, 47–48 (2005) (describing a view that, from a
fairness perspective (rather than strictly from an efficiency perspective), individuals should be taxed
on their endowments rather than their earned income, because otherwise “two taxpayers with identical
endowments could end up paying vastly different amounts in tax simply because one likes to work
and spend while the other prefers leisure”).
157. See, e.g., Glogower, supra note 11, at 1445–51 (describing a basis for comparing taxpayers
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to pay may be measured by reference to a taxpayer’s income, wealth, or a
combined measure of both.158 Finally, as described in Section IV.B below,
under a welfarist approach that would maximize a weighted measure of
individuals’ aggregate utility, the progressive tax base indicates the taxpayer’s
relative level of utility.159
These different understandings of ability to pay reflect different views on
how inequality should be measured and mitigated.
For example,
policymakers could seek to equalize individuals’ marginal utility or total
utility,160 or an objective measure of taxpayers’ resources or economic
outcomes.161
B. The Role of the Tax Base in Optimal Income Tax Theory
The principle of taxation in accordance with ability to pay plays a
different role within optimal tax theory, which would design tax rules to
maximize a weighted measure of aggregate social welfare,162 and provides a
method for assessing the social welfare resulting from different tax systems.163
based on their economic outcomes, as measured by their relative economic power). This view that
taxpayers should be compared and progressively taxed on the basis of their economic outcomes as a
normative matter—and not merely because of the administrative advantages of taxing observed
economic outcomes—dates back to the writings of Henry Simons and his definition of the tax base.
See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM
OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the
Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 32 (1992) (“Simons’ definition of income . . . must be
read in light of the gloss of control of economic resources . . . . It is this exercise of control that gives
a person the ‘ability to pay’ taxes . . . .”).
158. See Glogower, supra note 11, at 1437–38 (describing a basic choice between measuring ex
post economic outcomes or ex ante choices, such as whether to earn income, save, or make risky
investments).
159. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look
at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1946–48 (1987); infra notes 164–165 and
accompanying text.
160. See Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND LAW: SELECTED TANNER
LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 137, 140–55 (1987).
161. See, e.g., id. at 155–58 (describing Rawls’ alternative view of justice as requiring equality of
primary social goods including income and wealth); see also Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part
2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 283, 288–98 (1981) (contrasting the principles of
equality of welfare and equality of resources).
162. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 31 n.31 (2002). See infra
note 168 and accompanying text (the choice of the social welfare function in an optimal tax analysis
can reflect a range of views of distributive justice).
163. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 159, at 1945 (describing the role of optimal tax theory
within a welfarist view of distributive justice).
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Within this frame, progressive taxation would focus on “the tradeoff between
the potential social benefit of a more equal distribution . . . and the economic
costs . . . required by a redistributing tax system,”164 rather than strictly taxing
individuals according to their ability to pay.165 This method of analysis asks
how to achieve a desired degree of redistribution at the lowest social cost and
formalizes the evaluation of possible tradeoffs between the two objectives.
Optimal tax theory, however, similarly depends upon an antecedent and
normative choice as to how inequality should be measured and mitigated. A
traditional optimal tax analysis presumes that policymakers seek to achieve a
specified level of equality of utility,166 and that progressive taxation would be
justified under a principle of declining marginal utility of income.167 Within
this general framework, a social planner may optimize the tax system to reflect
a wide range of views of distributive justice, as reflected in different weights
on the utility of representative individuals in the social welfare function.168
In principle, the progressive tax base would also play a different role in
an optimal income tax analysis for reasons similar to why the concept of
ability to pay would play a different role. Economists James Banks and Peter
Diamond argue “that an initial choice of an ideal tax base drawn from an
asserted concept of fairness is not a good starting place for [tax] policy.”169
164. Joel Slemrod, Introduction to TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 1, 2–3 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1996).
165. See id. at 2. (arguing that the “ability-to-pay principle fails as an operational guide to tax
progressivity” because it does not independently specify how much more taxpayers with greater ability
should pay). The term “ability-to-pay” may still be used within an optimal tax analysis, however, in
reference to the assumption that taxpayers experience declining marginal utility of income. See, e.g.,
Musgrave, supra note 154, at 136–37 (characterizing a goal of welfare maximization as one
application of the ability to-pay-principle).
166. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 42 (2008)
(describing a social welfare function weighted to reflect “the degree of aversion to inequality in the
distribution of utility levels”). Kaplow refers to this adjustment to reflect the social preference for an
equality of utility as the first “concavity” in the social welfare function. Id. at 42–43. For arguments
for the positive taxation of capital income within an optimal tax framework, see Diamond & Saez,
supra note 23, at 177–83; David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption,
Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 413–31 (2015).
167. See KAPLOW, supra note 166, at 42–43 (referring to the principle of declining marginal utility
as accounting for the “second concavity” in the social welfare function).
168. Id. at 42–44 (describing how the choice of the social welfare function in an optimal tax analysis
will incorporate a specific view of distribution of justice); see also Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie
Stantcheva, Generalized Social Marginal Welfare Weights for Optimal Tax Theory, 106 AM. ECON.
REV. 24, 25 (2016) (describing how optimal tax theory can accommodate a broad range of views of
fairness through the choice of the social marginal welfare weight).
169. James Banks & Peter Diamond, The Base for Direct Taxation, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN:
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Rather, they argue that tax analysis should instead evaluate the economic
consequences of different tax structures, and then determine which structure
best maximizes utility levels in accordance with the chosen social welfare
function:
We conclude that the consideration of an ideal tax base lends itself to
too many concerns and conflicting answers to be viewed as a good
starting point for the consideration of taxation. An alternative start is
by examining the economic equilibria that occur with different tax
structures . . . . Thus, optimal tax theory is based on a consequential
philosophy. For each tax structure it describes the economic
equilibrium, and thus the utility levels of the different economic
agents. Then it asks which of these equilibria offers the utility levels
judged best by a social welfare function.170
This perspective, however, also depends upon antecedent and contingent
normative choices as to the measure of inequality progressive taxation should
mitigate.171 In an optimal tax analysis, even the assumption that policymakers
should optimize the tax system to equalize taxpayers’ utility—rather than to
equalize particular attributes such as income or wealth—reflects a particular
and contingent view of distributive justice.172 That is, while a welfarist frame
argues that the criterion to maximize under any chosen theory of distributive
justice should be welfare,173 this same argument does not also lead to the
conclusion that the criterion to equalize should also necessarily be welfare,
instead of some other measure of social outcomes that would be equalized
according to a different view of distributive justice.
For an example of this distinction, Banks and Diamond consider the
possibility that policymakers could instead evaluate tax policy in accordance
with a “social income” function rather than a “social welfare function,” and
only dismiss this alternative because of the problems with designing policy to
maximize income, but not necessarily because of any problems with designing
THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 548, 551 (James Mirrlees et al. eds., 2010).
170. Id. at 555.
171. See supra notes 166–168 and accompanying text.
172. See Sen, supra note 160 (describing the principle of equality of utility as just one possible
conception of distributive justice).
173. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 166, at 41 (describing that the normative premise of welfarism
“is that the only relevant aspect of a regime is the manner in which it affects each individual’s wellbeing”); Bankman & Griffith, supra note 159, at 1951.
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policy to equalize income.174 Furthermore, they suggest that policymakers
might nonetheless design tax policy to limit variations in income (rather than
strictly variations in utility) even within the context of an approach primarily
focused on optimizing a social welfare function.175
Any approach that accordingly moves away from a strict focus on
equalizing taxpayer utility could, in turn, imply a positive role for the
progressive tax base as articulating an “asserted concept of fairness,” and as a
basis for comparing taxpayers in accordance with this view. That is, if the
policymaker’s criterion for distributive justice is to limit differences in income
or wealth—rather than strictly in utility—then this approach would imply
measuring taxpayer’s relative income or wealth and comparing them on this
basis.
C. Wealth and Capital Income as Progressive Tax Bases
These different understandings of the progressive tax base can explain
when a wealth tax and a capital income tax may be comparable or even
interchangeable, and where they would diverge. With respect to the
mechanical calculating function of the tax base, a wealth tax can be roughly
replicated through a capital income tax. That is, the tax liability resulting from
a tax on the wealth base can be reproduced—to a degree—through the rateequivalent capital income tax.176 Similarly, in a traditional optimal tax
analysis that does not afford normative weight to the choice of a particular tax
base, policymakers might favor either a wealth tax or a capital income tax,
depending on which instrument can optimize the chosen social welfare
function.177 The choice between a wealth tax and a capital income tax matters,
however, in a case where the measure of equality to be mitigated is in fact the
taxpayer’s wealth or income,178 rather than their utility, which may be

174. See Banks & Diamond, supra note 169, at 600 (“While we share a concern about income
distribution, a social income evaluation function is no substitute for a social welfare function . . . .
This approach appears to give too much weight to encouraging work, particularly by low earners
. . . .”).
175. Id. (“Nevertheless, one might consider limiting income variation . . . which would also imply
rejecting possible Pareto gains.”).
176. See supra notes 57, 58–59 and accompanying text. Of course, the two instruments will yield
different tax liabilities in the case of higher or lower investment returns, as described above.
177. Supra notes 162–170 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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derivative from either.179
To illustrate these different understandings of the role of the progressive
tax base, consider the case of two representative taxpayers. As described
above, assume Wealth Holder 1 has $10,000 of wealth which earns a 10%
risk-free investment return each year, for a total annual return of $1,000.180
Now consider Worker 1, with no saved wealth and $1,000 of labor income.
Of course, generating any particular tax liability for Wealth Holder 1 could be
achieved through a tax on either her income or wealth, albeit with potentially
different costs of taxation.
If, however, policymakers specifically seek to order taxpayers on the
basis of both their income and wealth, then a capital income tax and a wealth
tax would not serve this function in the same manner. Very simply, the wealth
tax and the capital income tax would yield different measures of each
taxpayer’s relative position in reference to this normative basis for
redistribution. For example, measuring each taxpayer’s income alone would
suggest Wealth Holder 1 and Worker 1 are in similar economic circumstances,
when in fact Wealth Holder 1 has additional economic resources in the form
of her saved wealth.181
This perspective might appear tautological or conclusory: A wealth tax
and an income tax are different if taxpayers should be compared on the basis
of their economic circumstances, and wealth and income measure economic
circumstances differently. The presumption underlying an optimal income
tax analysis, however—that the social welfare function should be weighted to
represent a social preference for equality of utility rather than income or
wealth—is no less conclusory and is similarly normatively contingent.
Ultimately, this choice of the normative baseline for comparing taxpayers will
depend on the nature of the social preference for equality and the factors by
which it should be measured.

179. See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
181. Worker 1 may have the ability to earn income from labor in subsequent years as well, and
therefore could have more human capital than Wealth Holder 1. The purpose of this simplified
example is merely to illustrate the differences between accounting for wealth and capital income as
measures of ability to pay. For a discussion of how human and financial capital may be reconciled as
measures of taxpayer’s relative economic circumstances, see Glogower, supra note 11, at 1467–76.
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V. CONCLUSION
An improved capital income tax and a wealth tax represent two of the
most promising reform directions to reverse the regressive effects of the 2017
tax legislation and to rebuild the progressive tax system. This Essay considers
how these reforms may be compared and evaluated.
This Essay’s concept of a rate-equivalent capital income tax or wealth tax
can help to clarify the assumptions underlying comparisons of these reform
alternatives in the literature, and to allow for consistency in evaluating their
economic effects.182 As this Essay argues, in many respects the differences
between an improved capital income tax and a wealth tax are narrower than
they might appear, and the particular structure of each reform may matter
more than their formal labels.183 For this reason, policymakers should not
reach categorical conclusions that one reform direction is intrinsically more
desirable than the other. Both instruments would have similar economic
effects, and both would encounter similar challenges in administration and tax
avoidance opportunities, which could be overcome with similar potential
solutions. On the question of constitutionality as well, the differences
between a wealth tax and an improved capital income tax may be narrower
than the literature sometimes assumes.
As this Essay describes, however, an improved capital income tax and a
wealth tax can unambiguously differ in one critical respect: as different
measures for comparing taxpayers in a progressive tax system.184 This
distinction, however, will depend in turn on a normative choice as to how
inequality should be measured and mitigated by the tax system. For example,
the choice between a capital income tax and a wealth tax could have different
consequences, depending upon whether one assumes that the progressive tax
system should mitigate differences in utility, income, wealth, or a combination
thereof.
While this Essay focuses on the comparison of capital income tax and
wealth tax reforms, policymakers should also not assume that these reform
alternatives are mutually exclusive. Rather, both the similarities and
differences between the two tax instruments ultimately suggest why
policymakers should instead consider how they might be coordinated. As I
have argued in prior work, the integration of taxes on capital income taxes and
182. See supra Parts III, IV
183. See supra Sections III.A, III.B.
184. See supra Section IV.C.
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wealth could more accurately tailor tax burdens to taxpayers’ relative
economic circumstances, while avoiding the disadvantages of exclusive
reliance on one instrument or the other.185 The considerations described in
this Essay ultimately indicate why policymakers should consider a more
comprehensive approach to the roles of income and wealth in the tax system,
instead of simply choosing between an improved capital income tax or a
wealth tax.

185. See Glogower, supra note 11, at 1452–83.
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